For many multi-agent scenarios one can assume that the agents behave cooperatively and contribute to a common goal according to their design. However, our work focuses on competitive scenarios which are characterized by the agents' strong local interests, their high degree of autonomy, and the lack of global goals. Therefore, two agents will cooperate if, and only if, both will gain | or at least expect to gain | from that cooperation. This paper presents a con ict resolution mechanism which is appropriate for competitive resource allocation in dynamic environments. Its main issue is the integration of negotiation strategies in a distributed scheduling scenario. The basic ideas of the con ict resolution are a two-stage mechanism for the generation of counter-proposals within the course of a negotiation and a script representation for strategies.
Introduction
In contrast to multi-agent settings which follow a fully cooperative model, there are scenarios with quite di erent qualities. These are settings without a global goal function and with agents which follow exclusively local goals. Cooperation between two agents takes place only if both sides expect to pro t. We denote such scenarios as competitive.
Our application is a cooperation scenario involving an amount of companies. A company will always try to maximize its own pro ts and improve its market position rather than pursueing a goal which is common to all companies in the market. For example, it will not support the goal to minimize the overall 1 work-in-progress inventory. Nevertheless, it may take advantage of cooperation with competitors. For example, an agent might o er orders to other agents if they can process them cheaper, or if the local capacities are not su cient.
A restricted view to the global system state and agents pursueing di erent local goals are typical qualities in multi-agent systems, whereas in traditional centralized structured approaches these qualities hardly play any role. As a consequence of these problem characteristics con icts arise among the agents which have to be resolved. I.e. mechanisms 1 Here, 'overall' means taking into account the work-in-progress inventory of all companies in the scenario together.
for con ict resolution have to be integrated into a multi-agent approach in order to obtain global consistent solutions.
In competitive scenarios some problems make the con ict resolution more di cult than in fully cooperative ones. First of all, the amount of common knowledge is very small. In general, agents do not know the other agents' plans, goals, strategies, etc. An agent will not provide the others with that kind of information to avoid that they can take advantage of this knowledge. Thus, all the agents can do is to extract information out of the negotiation processes and build models of its competitors which are largely uncertain.
Furthermore, if an agent provides some information, it may not tell the truth. Interesting questions are: When is it pro table for agents to lie, and how can lies be discouraged. Palatnik and Rosenschein investigated some problems arising in that context PR94] .
The resolution of a con ict is achieved by the application of a con ict resolution strategy. There are di erent situations in which con icts occur, e.g. the con ict may concern a part of the schedule which is either still coarse grained or where already much ne planning was involved. Furthermore, we have di erent scenarios, e.g scenarios with many alternative resources or such without any alternatives. Di erent situations and di erent problem scenarios require varying strategies to resolve a con ict successfully. An agent therefore needs con ict resolution knowledge that enables it to react appropriately when it is faced with a con ict.
This paper presents a con ict resolution mechanism for distributed resource allocation which is suitable for competitive scenarios. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 di erent approaches are discussed and requirements for an appropriate con ict resolution mechanism are pointed out. Section 3 introduces the new concept, and nally, in section 4 some conclusive remarks are made.
Requirements
Competitive scenarios show some speci c characteristics which require appropriate conict resolution strategies. Most methods suitable for fully cooperative settings are not applicable.
Many approaches to con ict resolution among cooperative agents employ a more or less static set of strategies, one of which is chosen as a common strategy in the case a con ict occurs. This strategy might be either chosen through a negotiation between the agents (see for example the Cooperative Experts Framework LLC91]), or might be agreed upon directly because the agents have identical con ict resolution units (see for example the Cooperative Design Engine KB91]). With strategies which are common to all agents it is virtually impossible to model competitive scenarios where the agents are not willing to share the knowledge about their employed strategies. They have to be enabled to apply arbitrary strategies, however they believe their local interests are supported e ciently with.
Another popular method in cooperative domains is to let one of the con icting parties play a special role in the con ict resolution process. In the work of Polat and Guvenir, for instance, the agents have di erent roles in the negotiation process according to their knowledge and problem-solving capabilities PG92]. As far as competitive scenarios are concerned, this is not a feasible way. Here, agents will refuse to take part in negotiations in which they do not have equal rights, and therefore, may be put at a disadvantage or may be cheated.
Quite similar drawbacks have approaches in which the con ict resolution is done by an arbitrator agent (see for example Wer90] or SRSF90]). The existence of such an arbitrator is a quite unrealistic assumption in most cases. Con icts rather have to be resolved by direct negotiation between the con icting parties.
Let us brie y summarize the requirements for a con ict resolution mechanism suitable for our scenario which we have found so far:
Symmetry
None of the con icting parties must play an extraordinary role in the con ict resolution process, they must be given equal rights.
Private Strategies
Strategies have to be private in the sense that they are freely choosable by each of the con icting parties, and they are not accessible by the other agents.
No Arbitrators
The agents have to resolve con icts without help from some higher level instance.
Furthermore, there are several requirements which are not speci c for competitive scenarios, but have to be considered in other settings as well. The most important ones are listed in the following:
Stability
The con ict resolution should not yield an unstable behavior of the overall system, since instability results in undesired unpredictability of future market trends. In our scenario a stable system behavior is in the rst place expressed by stable prices and a low contract cancelation rate.
Exchangeable Strategies
An important characteristic of a market scenario is its dynamic, the company goals are subject to constant change. Therefore, an agent must have the capability to choose appropriate strategies, taking into consideration its own goals, the model it has about its negotiation partners, as well as the needs of its clients.
A Con ict Resolution Concept
In the following, an approach for con ict resolution in the scheduling domain is presented which meets the above-mentioned requirements. First, we will brie y describe the underlying scheduling model, then the employed agent model will be characterized, and last, the integration of con ict resolution strategies is addressed.
Scheduling model
The underlying scheduling model corresponds with the general job-shop scheduling model and is very similar to the model described in Win93]. It is described brie y in the following.
Time is considered discrete with a granularity t equal to 1. I.e. a point in time t in our model is actually an interval t; t + t . Therefore, points in time can be represented as integer numbers.
First of all we have a set of resources R = fR 1 ; : : : ; R s g which are available at the shop oor. Then we have resource groups G i and 8i : G i R. One resource group is bound to every activity which can be performed at the shop oor. Thus a resource group describes the set of alternative resources which can be employed for a certain activity. In general, resource groups contain more than one resource, i.e. more than one resource has the capability for performing the speci c activity. Otherwise, resources can be elements of more than one resource group, i.e. they can perform more than one activity.
A resource request rr = fG 1 ; : : : ; G m g is a set of resource groups, a resource assignment is a set of resources. A resource assignment ra ful lls a resource request rr if and only if a bijective mapping f exists from rr to ra and f(G) = R ) R 2 G. From this follows immediately that a resource cannot perform more than one activity at the same time.
A task T is a triple (sd T ; rr T ; d T ), with sd T is a range of valid start dates of T , rr T is the resource request of T , and d T is the duration of T . A task assignment for a task T is a pair (sda T ; ra T ), where sda T is a start date assignment of T , and ra T is a resource assignment of T .
Furthermore we have a set of jobs J = fJ 1 ; : : : ; J k g which are orders from some clients. Each job J is a pair (T J ; < J ), with T J is a set of tasks and < J is a partial order de ned on T J . For two tasks T 1 ; T 2 2 T J , T 1 < J T 2 holds true if sda T 1 + d T 1 sda T 2 . This partial order re ects the temporal dependence between tasks and can be seen as a kind of production plan.
A resource schedule of a resource R is a partial mapping of the set of tasks to integer numbers: : T 7 ! IN +?
0 . This mapping gives the start date assignments for all tasks which are planned for this resource. Now, scheduling means to nd a valid schedule for a given set of jobs. A valid schedule is a set of resource schedules f 1 ; : : : ; s g | one for each resource | with the following restrictions holding:
1. For all tasks the start date assignments are in the range of valid start dates 2 . 2. For each job J the partial order < J is ful lled. 3. For all tasks the resource assignment ful lls the resource request. 4. All resources which are assigned to a task are assigned for the same period of time. 5. Resources are not assigned to more than one task for the same period of time 3 .
The model allows that jobs can be brought into the system dynamically (onlinescheduling). For this reason not a xed set of tasks has to be scheduled but orders arriving at any point in time have to be included in the scheduling process immediately. Therefore another restriction must be considered: All activities have to be scheduled with start dates which are not prior to the point in time the schedule is released. 2 This also ensures that due dates are respected which are implicitly given by the valid start dates. I.e. all resources have the capacity one. But this is not a major restriction as resources with higher capacities may be modeled as multiple resources with capacity one.
For the representation of schedules we do not use an exact representation of time points or intervals. Instead, we represent the schedules with a dense function over time for each resource. This dense function describes the capacity usage of the resources and provides a feasible way for the evaluation of resource allocation requests. Maintaining exact schedules would be virtually impossible due to the large uncertainty during the early stage where inter-company cooperations are planned and negotiated.
Agent model
This section gives an overview of the applied agent model. Therefore, we will describe our agent design and how the agent is situated within its environment.
Agent roles
Typical for agents is that they are able to be involved in several di erent roles. An role of an agent forms its basic view, its goals, and behavior patterns (see Sun93] ). Agents are able to choose a certain role from their repertoire of roles according to the requirements of the current situation. In the following the two roles order agent and resource agent are essential which correspond largely to the roles manager and bidder, introduced in Smi88] within the scope of the contract net protocol.
The agent roles do not determine the agent's behavior completely, thus the agent is enabled to realize di erent strategies. On the one hand an agent might make use of variations on the resource allocation protocols. On the other hand an agent can freely choose values for the conditions of a contract (see section 3.2.3). Figure 1 shows the conceptual structure of the agent model which is used in our cooperation scenario. The agent is embedded in its environment which consists of three parts: The client environment from where jobs are brought into the system, the execution environment functioning as an outlet for jobs 4 , and nally the agent environment where jobs may be distributed via some cooperation mechanisms.
Agent architecture
An agent encapsulates all the knowledge it needs to realize its goals and also the appropriate processing mechanisms for that knowledge. The knowledge is kept explicitly represented in a local knowledge base which contains in the rst place knowledge about other agents, communication protocols, local goals, and skeleton plans that are instructions on how to manufacture products.
In addition to the knowledge base there are four agent components which operate quite independently and are connected via some internal interfaces.
The planning unit maintains a set of jobs it receives in irregular intervals from some clients. The planning unit has to build a production plan for a job | mostly by getting a prebuilt plan from the knowledge base | and determines a task which is to be scheduled next.
An agent is able to communicate through its communication unit with other agents. From a received message it extracts information and updates its local knowledge base 4 This does not really have to mean that jobs are physically executed but they are rather passed on to some subordinate planning instance. accordingly. Furthermore, the message is put into a certain context according to its type and contents. The agent then changes to the role intended for this context. The strategy unit contributes the strategic part to the con ict management. This unit is responsible for generating an appropriate response to a received message. Therefore, it uses strategy scripts which are interpreted by an integrated interpreter (see section 3.3).
The scheduling unit manages schedules, evaluates proposals for resource allocations from the strategy unit, and is able to nd alternative schedules to a given one which perform better. This unit is also the one which is connected to the execution environment and makes the necessary steps for the execution 5 of tasks.
Coordination and cooperation
In the distributed scheduling system each resource will be represented by a resource agent and each order by an order agent. These agents look after the goals concerning resources or orders respectively. The goals concerning a resource are mainly to use resources to capacity and to coordinate processing activities with servicing activities. The goals of an order agent can be manifold: The client's interest can be to produce a cheap product, to produce it as quickly as possible, etc.
The basis for the cooperation model is a monetary system. Order agents receive some currency for each order they are responsible for. They are free in how they spend their means of payment. For the realization of an order the order agent has to allocate a set of resources taking into consideration all temporal dependencies between the di erent tasks which are necessary for a single order. For an allocation by a resource agent it has to pay a certain price. In reaction costs arise for the resource agent for processing activities and for maintaining the resources | in particular also for resources lying idle.
For any kind of work, i.e. processing of orders or usage of resources, exist standard prices. But in a concrete case prices can go over or remain under these standard prices any way you like. On the one hand prices are subject to negotiation and con ict resolution strategies, and on the other hand prices may be adjusted if, for example, due dates are exceeded.
Order agents can freely decide upon the usage of any received currency. I.e. there is no need at all that they spend their fund received for a certain order on the allocation of resources needed for that particular order.
The allocation of resources is subject to negotiation. The negotiation protocol which is made use of corresponds largely with the well-known contract net protocol Smi88]. This protocol consists of the four phases request, o er, order, and con rmation. For an example for an employment of this protocol in a distributed planning system see also HFL96 ].
An order agent sends a request for a task to a set of resource agents with the required capabilities. This request proposes a cooperation between two agents and consists of some elements which give a description of that proposed cooperation | e.g. a requested resource type, a o ered price, etc. The resource agents in turn generate an o er as an alternative proposal. This o er possibly accepts the request totally or makes some modi cations on parts of the request. These two negotiation phases are repeated until a solution acceptable to both is found. The message types order and con rmation nish a negotiation.
We assume that the agents behave rationally. In our approach, an agent is rational if, and only if, it pursues the goal to maximize its pro ts. Thus, the termination of a negotiation is ensured if at least one of the agents uses a 'reasonable' strategy. This follows from the fact that an exceeding of due dates | because of long negotiations | lowers the order agent's pro t, and eventually it is cheaper to accept an inconvenient o er or to interrupt the negotiation. However, having two agents which both behave irrationally, a reasonable negotiation result cannot be expected.
If one task requires more than one resource all these resources are allocated through only one negotiation. The reason is that these resources must be reserved for the same time interval. Several independent negotiations for one task would require a much more complex synchronization mechanism.
One might think that the communication overhead is an issue in such a decentral approach to the resource allocation problem. But at least in the exible manufacturing domain | which is our main concern, but also in others | the execution times for the activities are very long in contrast to the negotiation times. Similar results could be proven with practical experiments in HFL96].
Con ict resolution strategies
Distributed scheduling yields con icts which result from inconsistent allocation requests of di erent agents for the same resource. These con icts have to be resolved. In other words, such a resource con ict means requests for one resource by at least two agents for overlapping periods of time. The reason for these inconsistencies lies both in the agents' restricted local views and in their di ering local interests.
The resolution mechanism
The agents use their capability to communicate for the resolution of any arising con icts. The syntactic, semantic, and procedural aspects of negotiation are speci ed in communication protocols which also describe a set of message types. Essential for strategies are the message types request and o er, both representing cooperation proposals. These proposals consist of several conditions of a contract. Such a condition is an attribute like a price or a time interval. A favorable assignment of values to the terms of a contract is used for managing the con ict resolution and thus for scheduling strategies.
At rst we have to clarify what kind of strategies we are considering. In the rst place a strategy supports the decision whether a request | or an o er respectively | for a resource allocation should be accepted or not. An e cient strategy must not only determine a threshold which is to be exceeded by the valuation of a proposal. Beside a valuation also other aspects should be considered including the current supply and demand for the requested resource, order priorities, or the course of the negotiation so far. However, strategies should be designed for generating an agent behavior which supports the agent's goals.
If an agent rejects a proposal addressed to it, it has to generate an alternative suggestion. This alternative suggestion is built by adjusting some or all of the conditions of the contract in a way that the valuation of the so corrected proposal becomes more favorable. In principle, an alternative always exists because one can always shift a time interval to some later start date | although the price may become very high if due dates are exceeded. It is also possible that negotiations are interrupted without having found a feasible solution. An order agent might do so if alternative resources exist.
An alternative proposal is found through a two-stage mechanism: In a rst phase the received proposal is analyzed according to its utility for the agent's local goal. Therefore, the pro t is computed dependent on varying values for the conditions of the contract. In other words, we have a cost function which maps contract conditions to the pro t resulting from those values. Note that the outcome may have a negative value as well. This can happen whenever an o ered price is not high enough to compensate the expenditures which arise from the insertion of the new task into the schedule 6 .
The overall gain is the di erence between the values of the schedule with the requested task inserted according to the proposal and the current schedule. If no overlappings occur when the task is inserted, a simple balance can be calculated. If in contrast the task overlaps one or more other tasks, rst a cancelation must be found which allows the insertion. The costs for any cancelation have to be considered in the balance. Note that it may be a complex problem to nd an optimal cancelation which is the cheapest concerning the expense it imposes. But one can nd simple heuristics which lead to suboptimal solutions and achieve good approximations.
With this cost function we can build a proposal evaluation by calculating the overall gain for some discrete values for the conditions of the contract around the proposed values. These expenditures especially become very high if other tasks have to be canceled in order to make the insertion possible. This proposal evaluation constitutes the basis for the second phase of our generation of counter proposals. Any proposal can be seen as a point in the proposal space de ned by the conditions of the contract. Pro t is a characteristic of each proposal. Now, the task of the second phase is to move the cooperation partner's proposal to some alternative point in the proposal space. For that, the pro t characteristic of each point is used which was computed in the rst phase.
Two aspects have to be considered for the counter-proposals. First, the agent has to take into account its local goals and guide the search for the counter-proposal accordingly. Second, if an agent wants to increase its pro t by cooperating it has to make that cooperation possible by generating acceptable proposals. This requires the capability to compromise, and hence, the capability to maintain appropriate models of the competitors.
Example Figure 3 illustrates an example for a search for a counter-proposal. It is an isoline version of gure 2 with a received proposal marked as P . It is assumed that the agent's goal is to increase the utilization of its resources and it regards the following strategy as appropriate for achieving this goal: It tries to make its o ers as attractive as possible for its negotiation partners. Therefore, it asks the lowest price which is still acceptable in combination with a time interval which is not too far from the original one.
An agent's negotiation strategy has to be expressed by an intelligent search strategy in the proposal space. Therefore, we provide a script language with high level operations such as 'climb up a hill' or 'go along an isoline'. Those operations can be restricted by some constraints like a maximum distance or a range of search directions if appropriate. The terms of a contract are estimated as acceptable if their valuation exceeds an acceptance threshold. In our example, the rst goal of the search strategy is to reach a near and acceptable point. This is accomplished by applying the hill-climbing instruction which is provided by our script language together with an additional constraint on the maximum altitude to climb and yields point Q. The reachability of a certain altitude is ensured if an agent is rational, an therefore, uses a proposal valuation which is strong monotonous in the price dimension. The goal of the second part of our search strategy is to lower the price condition of the contract without changing its overall valuation. This is achieved by walking along an isoline through Q as long as the price still gets down | to point C in gure 3.
Note that a proposal evaluation does not have to be computed completely. Due to our negotiation mechanism it is su cient to compute some values in the near environment of a received proposal rst and then enlarge this region in the desired direction.
Strategy scripts
Strategies are represented as scripts which are to be interpreted by the strategy unit. They are embedded in the negotiation protocols as far as the strategy scripts are restricted to those respecting the valid protocols. I.e. the negotiation protocols provide skeletons for strategy scripts. The computations concerning the negotiation strategies have to be lled into these skeletons.
An agent is able to take part in several negotiations simultaneously, i.e. the interpreter must handle several strategy scripts at the same time. This is achieved by the interruptability of scripts and by introducing negotiation contexts. Scripts are interruptible in a way that whenever a message has to be waited for according to the employed negotiation protocol the interpreter saves the current state | in order to make it possible to resume this negotiation eventually | and suspends the interpretation of the current script. At the beginning of a negotiation a new negotiation context is created and each message belonging to that particular context is labeled with this context. Thus on the receipt of a message an agent can decide which negotiation to resume.
The simultaneous handling of strategy scripts causes side-e ects between them in a way that a decision made within a script A may have impact on a negotiation realized through a script B. To reduce the number of side-e ects the agents do not negotiate simultaneously about tasks which are constrained by a partial order, i.e. not about two tasks T 1 ; T 2 2 T J with T 1 < J T 2 _ T 2 < J T 1 . Remaining con icts between negotiations are resolved in a reactiv way. Negotiations which are nished rst will be inserted into the resource schedule.
Conclusion and future work
This paper presented a con ict resolution concept for multi-agent systems which is suitable for competitive scenarios.
The most important feature of this concept is that the agents' con ict resolution strategies are private, i.e. not accessible by other agents. Therefore, an agent is enabled to preserve its local interests. Of course the possibility to share a common strategy remains. Furthermore, the agents have equal rights concerning the resolution mechanism | no coordinating instance at a higher level is needed. The strategies are represented in a script form which provides easy readability and modi ability together with a high expressiveness. Strategies are not hard coded within the algorithms like in previous works in that eld, and thus allowing dynamic adaption of negotiation strategies at run time. Currently e ort is spent on building a prototypical implementation of the described system. This prototype will also include a simulation environment which serves as a testbed for the e ciency of di erent strategies in di erent manufacturing scenarios. The next goal is to investigate the e ects of some strategies on the scheduling results | especially the impact on job lateness, in-process inventory, job idle time, and machine utilization. We hope to nish the rst prototype implementation in a few months and will come out with the rst experimental results soon afterwards.
